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Abstract  
 
The proliferation of private tutoring is a widespread phenomenon, Korea being one the 
most notable examples. Indeed, successive Korean governments have attempted to limit 
private tutoring consumption for more than four decades. In 2006, state education authorities 
imposed a restriction on operating hours of hagwon (private tutoring academies) in an 
attempt at reducing the economic and time resources spent on private tutoring. Since then, 
some provincial authorities have modified the curfew on hagwon. We take advantage of these 
policy shifts to identify average treatment effects taking a difference-in-differences approach. 
Our findings suggest that enforcing the curfew did not generate a significant reduction in the 
hours and resources spent on private tutoring, our results being heterogeneous by school level 
and socioeconomic status. Demand for private tutoring seems to be especially inelastic for 
high school students, who increased their consumption of alternative forms of private 
tutoring. As the consumption of private tutoring is positively correlated with academic 
performance and socioeconomic status, strengthening the curfew may have a negative effect 
on the equality of educational opportunities. 
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Regulating private tutoring consumption in Korea: lessons from another 
failure 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Private tutoring can be defined as a set of activities, supplementary to mainstream 
schooling, whose aim is to boost academic performance in exchange for monetary payment 
(Bray, 1999; Bray, 2006). Private tutoring can adopt a variety of forms: one-to-one classes, 
group classes or even radio or internet-based tuition. The proliferation of private tutoring 
seems to be a growing phenomenon in several countries across different continents (Bray and 
Kwo, 2014), its causes being heterogeneous (Dang, 2007; Tansel and Bircan, 2006). 
Private tutoring has several beneficial effects, the main one being a student’s enhanced 
academic performance. However, this so-called “shadow education” (Bray, 1999; Bray, 
2009) can also have various detrimental effects, not least the high opportunity cost for the 
students and the heavy financial burden for their families. Private tutoring consumption is 
positively correlated with household income (OECD, 2014); therefore, if the amount of 
private tutoring received affect academic achievement – as some studies, including Choi, 
Calero, and Escardibul (2012), seem to suggest – then concerns are raised about the equity 
and equality of educational opportunities.  
The Republic of Korea (hereinafter, Korea) has one of the largest private tutoring 
industries in the world. The OECD (2012a:24) reports that the burden of private tutoring on 
Korean households accounted for 10.7% of average household income per student in 2010 
(making it also a key factor in explaining the country’s low fertility rates). According to the 
2009 Survey of Private Education Expenditure (SPEE) conducted by the Korean National 
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Statistics Office (KOSTAT), 87.4% of elementary school students, 74.3% of middle school 
students and 62.8% of general high school students received private tutoring in 20091, with 
an average monthly private tutoring expenditure per student of 242 thousand Korean won 
(approximately 220 US dollars) in 2009. Total expenditure on private tutoring in Korea 
amounted to 21.626 trillion won, equivalent to 2% of Korea’s GDP. According to this same 
survey, two thirds of those who receive private tutoring are taking lessons at private academic 
institutes, called hagwon. 
Since the 1970s, Korea has been at the front line of the design of new policies for tackling 
the proliferation of private tutoring. In 2006, in a new attempt to curb the thriving private 
tutoring market and to revive public education, the Korean government decided to place a 10 
p.m. curfew on the operating hours of hagwon. As a result, household spending on private 
tutoring has gradually decreased since reaching its highest peak in 2009. The government 
believes that the fall in private tutoring expenditure is an indication that the reforms have 
begun to take effect and that the 10 p.m. curfew has played a substantial role in this (Han 
2011). However, to conclude that this reduction is attributable to the hagwon curfew may be 
erroneous as other factors, such as the sluggish real economy, could also have had an impact 
on the fall in private tutoring expenditure.  
The main aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the advancement in the 
implementation this new policy (i.e., the curfew on the academies’ operating hours) aimed at 
regulating private tutoring markets. More specifically, we focus on the effect of enforcing the 
curfew on private education expenditure and on the time dedicated to private tutoring 
activities. We estimate mean and heterogeneous effects by educational level and 
socioeconomic status applying difference-in-differences (DD) estimators to the 2009-2012 
                                                          
1
 Bray (2013:414) reports similar information for a set of ten countries where private tutoring is prevalent. The 
only country where figures were close to Korea’s  was urban China, where 73,8%, 65,6% and 53,5% of primary, 
lower secondary school and high school students, respectively, consumed private tutoring. 
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waves of the SPEE. By doing so, we are able to overcome many of the information problems 
identified by Bray and Kobakhidze (2014) in previous studies of private tutoring2. 
The main findings of this study can be summed up as follows: First, enforcing the 
extension of the curfew did not generate a significant reduction in the hours and resources 
spent on private tutoring. Second, demand for private tutoring seems to be especially inelastic 
for high school students, who increased their consumption of alternative forms of private 
tutoring. This raises equity issues concerning equality of educational opportunities, given the 
higher cost of these alternative forms of private tutoring. Policy recommendations based on 
our analysis should be of interest not only for Korean authorities but also for the wide set of 
countries with an overheated private tutoring market. 
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the demand for and the 
impact of private tutoring, and charts the struggle mounted by Korean authorities against this 
phenomenon, the hagwon curfew being one of their latest attempts. Section 3 describes the 
empirical methodology and the dataset employed in the analysis. In section 4 we present our 
main results concerning the impact of strengthening the curfew on expenditure and on the 
time spent on private tutoring activities. The section concludes with a discussion of these 
results and their policy implications. 
 
2. Private tutoring in Korea: demand, impacts and policy evolution 
 
Korea is one of the most frequently studied cases in the private tutoring literature, due to 
the magnitude of the business and the seriousness with which successive governments have 
sought to control it. In this section we present a brief overview of the demand for and the 
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 More specifically, Bray and Khobakhidze (2014) focus on the problems of international assessments such as 
TIMSS and PISA. The cross-sectional nature of data, imprecise questions and broad definitions of “private 
tutoring” are among the most relevant shortfalls of these databases. 
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impact of private tutoring (2.1), we summarize the campaign mounted by the Korean 
authorities against private tutoring (2.2) and, finally, we explain the curfew imposed on the 
hagwon (2.3). 
 
2.1. Demand for and impact of private tutoring 
 
Various factors account for the proliferation of private tutoring in Korea, a country where, 
as it will be seen, Bourdieu’s cultural and social reproduction theory has a high explanatory 
capacity (Bourdieu, 1973). In this sense, Korean families regard education as one of the main 
channels for ensuring class reproduction and social promotion. Kim and Lee (2010) claim 
that parents demand private tutoring as a means of compensating for the poor quality of state 
schooling, especially because the former provides more individualized attention. This 
argument is persuasive; yet, it seems insufficient to explain the overheated demand for 
private tutoring in the country. The fact that Korean public education expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP is 4.7%, higher that is than the 2009 OECD average of 4.0%, suggests 
that the relative competitiveness of public education may be low not because of the level of 
public investment, but because of the country’s more consumer-oriented, high quality private 
tutoring services (OECD, 2012b:4). Alternatively, Bray (2006) claims that low salaries paid 
to mainstream teachers may likewise yield an increase in demand for private tutoring in some 
developing countries. However, this is not the case in Korea, where teachers are well-paid in 
comparison to their counterparts in other OECD countries -only German and Luxembourger 
high school teachers at the top of the scale are better paid than the Korean (OECD, 2015).  
Bray and Kwok (2003), among others, observe that the cultural history of Korea is another 
critical reason accounting for the demand for private tutoring. Many Asian countries, 
including Korea, have been highly influenced by Confucianism, a system of teachings in 
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which the importance of education is emphasized as a tool for personal development and the 
primary mechanism promoting mobility (Choi, 2010:24).  
Finally, against this cultural backdrop, the sizeable economic and non-economic premiums 
of graduating from an elite university further shape a scenario in which the country is 
obsessed with private tutoring (Choi et al., 2012; Chae, Hong, and Lee, 2005). Since 1950, 
the Korean education system has adopted the following structure: six years of primary 
school; three years of lower secondary education; three years of upper secondary education; 
and four years of university studies. There are two types of high school: general high schools, 
where pupils are educated to go on to university, and vocational high schools. The first nine 
years of schooling are compulsory and free, while high school education is virtually 
universal, with only modest tuition fees being charged (Kim, 2004:3). According to the 
OECD (2011), in 2009, 98% of 25 to 34-year-old Koreans had successfully finished high 
school education, while 63% of these had completed tertiary education: both proportions are 
the highest among all OECD countries. The percentage of high school graduates who begin 
four-year university courses or two-year technical college studies was reported to be 83.8% in 
2008, which is also very high compared to other OECD countries (KEDI, 2009:66). 
However, as the average university degree premium fell, competition for admission to the 
more prestigious universities became notoriously fiercer. As Lee and Brinton (1996) and 
Choi et al. (2012) highlight, the benefits of attending an elite university in Korea extend well 
beyond those of an individual’s human capital, as school ties provide additional advantages in 
the labor market as a crucial source of social capital. Thus, young students face a tremendous 
amount of competition for the few places offered by the most prestigious universities as 
parents are willing to adopt any strategy to help their children gain an upper hand over their 
competitors (Park, Byun, and Kim, 2011).  
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College entrance depends primarily on academic achievement at school and on the results 
of the College Scholastic Achievement Test (CSAT), an objectively graded examination sat 
once a year. Consequently, most general high school students focus exclusively on test 
preparation (Byun, Schofer, and Kim, 2012) and Korean families end up spending 
considerable sums of money on private tutoring to support their children, a practice that is not 
limited solely to children from higher socio-economic groups, but one that is widespread 
across the income groups (Lee, Jwa, and Lim, 2014).  
The intensity with which private tutoring is consumed has both advantages and 
disadvantages. The main advantage is that pupils enhance their learning outcomes, a result 
supported by several studies (see, for example, Dang and Rogers, 2008; Kang, 2007). This 
enhanced academic achievement may also be beneficial to the economy as a whole, since the 
accumulation of human capital increases labor productivity, prompting economic growth. 
Additionally, private tutoring has a positive effect on the labor market: in 2009, this sector 
became the largest employer of graduates in the humanities and social sciences (OECD, 
2014:95). 
However, various experts conclude that the proliferation of private tutoring can have a 
number of harmful impacts. First, in a highly competitive environment, the health of the 
country’s pupils is put a risk. This is especially true of students receiving private tuition late 
into the night and on weekends (Rhie, Lee, and Chae, 2011). Second, a reliance on private 
tutoring inevitably has some impact on public education. As students are often already 
familiar with the material being taught at school (having already studied it privately), the 
levels of motivation of both students and teachers are negatively affected (Choi et al., 2012). 
Third, a dependence on private tutoring may impede the development of students’ self-
directed learning and problem-solving abilities (Kim, 2010:7). Fourth, private tutoring has an 
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opportunity cost which may restrict the development of skills and contents beyond those 
taught at school. 
In addition to these various effects, another serious problem identified by economists is 
that private tutoring gives rise to an issue of efficiency as well as one of equity. First, private 
tutoring activities may generate negative externalities, since students are likely to demand 
more private tutoring services than their optimum level so as to at least maintain their relative 
positions in the academic performance distribution (Kim, 2010). As a result, private tutoring 
may be over-consumed, compared to a socially optimum level, despite the fact that the 
amount of private tutoring consumed by each student is individually optimal. As such, the 
overheated private tutoring market in Korea can be explained in the framework of the classic 
prisoner’s dilemma which leads to a socially inefficient equilibrium (Choi, 2010). In other 
words, decisions which are rational at the individual level –consuming private tutoring- can 
lead to a socially inefficient situation –the country may not be investing in other activities 
with a higher return. 
As regards the equity issue, private tutoring is expensive, which means students from 
wealthier families are likely to consume more or higher quality services. Indeed, Korean 
families perceive one-to-one and group tuition – the most expensive types of private tutoring 
– as being the most effective 3 . All in all, this situation can undermine the equality of 
educational opportunities. Thus, the Korean government has adopted different measures over 
recent decades in an attempt to control private tutoring for reasons of both efficiency and 
equity. 
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 Choi (2008), however, is unable to confirm the greater effectiveness of one-to-one tutoring. His results suggest 
that the effect of private, one-to-one tutoring on college entrance is positive, but statistically insignificant.  
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2.2. A testing ground for regulating private tutoring 
 
In 1969, the government effectively ended selective education at the middle school level 
by abolishing entrance examinations. The primary aim was to control what was seen as 
wasteful private tutoring competition among children preparing for entrance exams to the 
most prestigious middle schools (Chung, 2002). For the same motive, in 1974, the high 
school equalization policy4 was implemented in Seoul and Busan, Korea’s two largest cities, 
and subsequently expanded to several other major cities through to 1980 (Kim and Lee, 
2010). However, contrary to government expectations, spending on private tutoring showed 
no signs of abating. Rather, the equalization policy contributed significantly to raising the 
demand for individualized education (Kang, 2007), as households turned to private tutoring 
as a tool to supplement the equalized state education system (Kim and Lee, 2010). 
Against this backdrop, in 1980, the Korean government took steps to prohibit all forms of 
private tutoring. However, parents, willing to hire private tutors at any expense, turned to the 
black private to meet their demand. At the same time, the suppliers of illegal private services 
demanded risk premiums, thus increasing further the price. Thus, paradoxically, the 
regulation of private tutoring seems to have exacerbated the inequality of educational 
opportunities by polarizing the consumption of the sector’s services. 
The democratization and liberalization of Korea saw the outright ban on private tutoring 
relaxed somewhat. However, until the Constitutional Court ruled that the prohibition on 
private tutoring was indeed unconstitutional in 2000, the government had only permitted two 
types of operator: college students and the hagwon. In the latter case, the government 
imposed strict restrictions in the form of specific requirements regarding the qualifications of 
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 The high school equalization policy introduced a lottery system whereby students were randomly allocated to 
the public and private schools within a province. As a result, the schools became more homogeneous as they 
could no longer select students and curricula, teacher salaries and tuition fees were regulated by the government. 
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the instructors, the schools facilities, and fees (Kang 2007). Despite this, the number of 
hagwon increased dramatically from 381 in 1980 to 14,043 in 2000, while the number of 
students enrolled at hagwon increased in the same period from 118,000 to 1,388,000 (Kim 
and Lee, 2010). According to National Tax Service data, there were nearly 105,000 hagwon 
operating in Korea by 2013, up from 92,433 in 2008 (Korean Economic Daily, 2015).  
At the same time, the government has sought to strengthen public education in the belief 
that the gap between the quality of mainstream education and private tutoring accounts for 
the willingness of households to hire private tutoring services. Thus, the government has 
increased inputs to public education substantially in an effort to improve school facilities, the 
student-teacher ratio, and the quality of school teachers. However, despite the marked 
increase in government spending, household spending on private tutoring has continued to 
rise at a remarkable pace (Kim and Lee, 2010). 
Since the first decade of the new century, the government has been actively involved in 
providing low-cost substitutes for private tutoring so that demand for the latter could be 
absorbed into the public system. These reforms include the Educational Broadcasting System 
(EBS) lectures that specifically focus on preparing the CSAT, and “after-school” programs, 
introduced in 2006, that offer hagwon-like lessons in schools.5 These measures, however, did 
little to cool the demand for private tutoring. As links between the EBS lectures and the 
CSAT intensified (with many CSAT questions being drawn from the EBS lectures), hagwon 
that specifically focused on the EBS lectures became very popular. The “after-school” 
programs enjoyed some success, especially as they provided low-income pupils with 
additional education opportunities. However, students from wealthier backgrounds continued 
to consume private tutoring services. Indeed, some were found to attend both the “after-
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 These are extra lessons offered by the schools for which students pay a small tuition fee, the government 
meeting the extra-funding needed. Initially, schools were forbidden from signing contracts with private 
institutions to provide these after-school programs. 
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school” programs and to receive private tutorials. According to the 2009-2012 SPEE data, 
49.8% of middle and high school students whose monthly household income was more than 4 
million Korean won both received private tutoring and attended the “after-school” programs, 
while 27.7% of them only enrolled for private tutoring. In the case of households with a 
monthly income equal to or below the 4 million won threshold, these figures were 37.5 and 
18.1%, respectively. 
In addition, the government has reformed the university entrance system several times, 
seeking to reduce the importance attached to the CSAT and by introducing elements to the 
admissions system that cannot be acquired by simple memorization. Thus, greater importance 
is now attached to other selection criteria, including high school records, essay-style exams, 
extra-curricular activities, involvement in social services, while socio-economic 
disadvantages are also taken into account. However, these reforms have also failed to be 
effective and have actually ushered in new forms of private tutoring that specialize in the 
enhancement of the new selection criteria (Choi et al., 2012). 
 
2.3. The 10 p.m. curfew on operating hours of hagwon 
 
As the measures aimed at curbing the demand for private tutoring proved ineffective, in 
2006 the government introduced a new measure, namely, the regulation6 of the operating 
hours of hagwon. Before 2006, closing hours in some regions were already controlled by 
local ordinances; however, these curfews had no real authority in law (Kang, 2010). In 
September 2006, the reform of the “Act on the establishment and operation of private 
teaching institutes and extracurricular lessons” strengthened the powers of each of the 
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 Bray and Kwo (2014) review different types of regulation from a comparative perspective. 
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municipal and provincial education offices with regards their regulatory authority over the 
hagwon. By 2009, all the offices had imposed a curfew on the operating hours of hagwon. 
In April 2009, Seungjoon Kwak, chairman of the Presidential Council on Future and 
Vision first raised the possibility of fixing the same 10 p.m. curfew for all hagwon. He argued 
that this restriction would help households cut their expenditure on private tutoring and 
safeguard the health of their children. However, the plan faced strong opposition from a 
group of hagwon owners and parents, who claimed that the policy would result in many 
students going to the hagwon in the early morning and on weekends, especially as many high 
schools were keeping pupils at schools until 10 or even 11 p.m. (Kang, 2009). Others argued 
that while the policy might reduce the time students spent on private tutoring activities in the 
hagwon, the demand for private tutoring services would simply be substituted by private 
tutors. In this case, the curfew would simply widen the gap between high- and low-income 
earners, given that the former would be able to hire the best private tutors (Bae, 2009). 
Indeed, a group of hagwon operators in Seoul and Busan, with the support of both parents 
and students petitioned the Constitutional Court, claiming that the curfew violated children’s 
educational rights. Despite the opposition, the curfew was declared constitutional by the court 
in October 2009, and the nationwide implementation of the 10 p.m. closure gained 
momentum. That same month, the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology reported 
that the government was expected to urge the amendment of the ordinances of the education 
offices in all cities and provinces and to fix a 10 p.m. curfew. At the same time, the 
government cracked down on those hagwon that violated the curfew, even offering financial 
rewards to citizens who reported offenders. Daegu, Gwangju, and Gyeonggi revised their 
ordinances accordingly in 2011, while the rest of the regions have been pushing ahead with 
the reform. As a result, a total of 13 education offices have completed or partly completed the 
revision of their ordinances regulating the operating hours of hagwon to 10 p.m. (KEDI, 
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2012:15-16). Table 1 provides a summary, by educational level and Korean province, of 
recent changes in the closing times of hagwon. As can be seen, during the period 2009 to 
2012 period, the provinces have either maintained or tightened the curfew. 
 
Table 1. Curfew imposed on hagwon (closing times), 2009-2012  
   Middle school students (p.m.) 
 Region 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 Daegu 12 12 10 10 
 Jeonnam 12 12 10 10 
Treatment group Incheon 12 12 12 10 
 Gyeonggi 11 11 10 10 
 Jeju 12 12 12 11 
 Seoul 10 10 10 10 
 Busan 10 10 10 10 
Control group Gwangju 10 10 10 10 
 Chungbuk 11 11 11 11 
 Gyeongbuk  11 11 11 11 
 Ulsan 12 12 12 12 
 Gyeongnam 12 12 12 12 
   High school students (p.m.) 
 Region 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 Daegu 12 12 10 10 
Treatment group Gwangju 12 12 10 10 
 Gyeonggi 12 12 10 10 
 Incheon 12 12 12 11 
 Seoul 10 10 10 10 
 Busan 11 11 11 11 
 Ulsan 12 12 12 12 
Control group Chungbuk 12 12 12 12 
 Jeonnam 12 12 12a 12a 
 Gyeongbuk 12 12 12 12 
 Gyeongnam 12 12 12 12 
 Jeju 12 12 12 12 
SOURCE: Ordinance regarding the establishment and operation of private teaching institutes and extracurricular 
lessons specified on the website of each city and provincial education office.  
a
 The exact curfew for Jeonnam is 11:50 p.m.  
  
However, there is little evidence of the effectiveness of the curfews in achieving their 
objectives (i.e., reducing expenditure and the time spent on private tutoring activities). While 
there are a number of papers which have analyzed previous policies -for example, Lee et al. 
(2010) or Byun (2010)-, to the best of our knowledge, only Kim (2009), Kim and Chang 
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(2010), and Choi and Cho (2015) have attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of this 
regulation. Kim (2009) and Kim and Chang (2010) applied Tobit models to two different 
databases, and found a small negative impact of time regulations on monthly expenditure and 
weekly hours spent on private tutoring. Kim (2009) did not find any evidence that the 
regulation significantly increased monthly spending on other types of private tutoring. Both 
studies specifically analyzed the effect of regulating the operating hours of hagwon on 
household spending on private tutoring for general high school students before the enactment 
of the 10 p.m. curfew. Unlike Kim (2009) and Kim and Chang (2010), the present paper, 
using the more robust methodological framework of difference-in-differences, measures the 
actual impact of the implementation of the 10 p.m. curfew on private tutoring expenditure by 
focusing on changes in the curfews that have been made since 2009. We also analyze 
heterogeneous effects by socioeconomic and educational level, namely, middle school and 
general high school.  
Choi and Cho (2105) used a difference-in-difference framework for analyzing the impact 
of the curfew on spending and time spent in private tutoring. They focused on mean effects 
for high school students. While studying mean results is useful for describing general trends, 
it is insufficient for understanding the mechanisms driving the (in)effectiveness of a complex 
policy such as the curfew. Additionally, as it will be explained in section 3, their use of a 
linear model for treating censored data may be misleading.  
While the expected impact of the curfew on expenditure and time spent on hagwon is 
trivial (a reduction in both), the overall effect of the measure on expenditure and time spent 
on private tutoring in general remains unclear. As alternative forms of private tutoring – most 
specifically, one-to-one and group tuition – are more expensive, the overall effect of the 
policy will depend on the prevalence of substitution or income effect. If admission to the top 
universities is the main objective driving the demand for private tutoring services, we would 
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expect the substitution effect to prevail – i.e., families showing a greater willingness to hire 
additional forms of private tutoring as the date for sitting the CSAT approaches. 
 
3. Methodology and data  
 
3.1. Methodological approach: Difference-in-Differences (DD) estimation 
 
The intuition behind the difference-in-differences (DD) method is that to investigate the 
effect of a specific intervention (“treatment”), the difference in outcomes after and before the 
intervention for groups affected by that intervention (“treatment groups”) are compared with 
the same difference for unaffected groups (“control groups”) (Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan, 2004:249). Applied to the issue at stake, the DD approach compares shifts in 
private tutoring expenditure for students in regions that have changed their curfew on hagwon, 
to those in regions that have maintained their initial curfew. 
Given that the curfew policy is not completely exogenous, i.e., some unobserved regional-
level characteristics may affect both the regulation of the operating hours of the hagwon and 
private tutoring expenditure (our two dependent variables), the error term might be correlated 
with the independent variable. Parents’ zeal for children’s education can be taken as an 
example of such unobserved regional-level characteristics. Parents in some regions might be 
more eager to invest in their children’s education –for example, Kang et al. (2007) suggest 
the equalization policy7 might have led some families to move to larger cities. Basically, their 
level of enthusiasm for children’s education is unobservable, but is likely to have an impact 
on local education offices’ decision on regulating of the operating hours of hagwon as well as 
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 The so-called equalization policy, applied in Korea since the 1970 decade, consists in the assignment of 
students to schools based strictly on their neighbourhood of residence. 
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average private tutoring expenditure in those regions. Being concerned about the soaring 
private tutoring expenditure, they may support the policy of strengthening the hagwon curfew 
or it may be the opposite case if they want their willingness to make an investment in 
children’s education to be unconstrained from the hagwon curfew.  
The presence of the endogeneity problem thus leads an OLS estimator to be biased. If the 
average treatment effect of the regulation of the operating hours of the hagwon on private 
tutoring expenditure is measured by comparing average private tutoring expenditures across 
regions applying a simple OLS estimator to cross-section data, the estimate will be biased as 
other unobservable characteristics such as parents’ zeal for children’s education affecting 
both the regulation of the operating hours of the hagwon and private tutoring expenditure 
may differ by region. On the other hand, if the research question is analyzed by comparing 
average private tutoring expenditure of the same region before and after the policy change, it 
will also produce bias since other characteristics affecting private tutoring expenditure may 
have changed over time as well. In both cases, the OLS estimator is biased, and thus does not 
measure a causal effect, but only a correlation. 
Under certain assumptions, the DD method allows us to at least control for the unobserved 
regional-level characteristics that are fixed over time, thus removing a potentially large 
source of omitted variable bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). DD estimations control for time-
invariant regional-level characteristics by comparing private tutoring expenditure costs and 
the time spent on private tutoring activities within regions over time and shared time trends 
by comparing differences across regions. Therefore, the use of the DD estimation enables us 
to measure the unbiased treatment effect of the regulation of the operating hours of hagwon. 
As discussed above, by 2009 all provincial education offices around the country had fixed 
their own curfew on the hagwon; however, some of them changed this restriction in 2011 and 
2012. This variation of hagwon curfew policy across regions makes it appropriate to exploit a 
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DD estimator to investigate the effect of the regulation on private tutoring expenditure. The 
treated group comprises those regions that modified their curfew between 2009 and 2012. 
Thus, the treatment considered in this study is not exactly the imposition of the 10 p.m. 
curfew, but rather the further strengthening of existing curfews (Table 1). The fact that the 
curfew time even differs within a region by school level, led us to split the analysis between 
middle and general high school students, the main consumers of private tutoring in Korea. 
Control groups are identified, for each educational level, as those regions in which the 
hagwon closing times remained constant during the period.  
Table 1 provides a summary of the curfews fixed by each education office. Based on the 
previous discussion, seven treatment groups are identified for middle school students and 
four for high school students. In 2011, the Jeonnam education office changed its curfew from 
midnight to 11:50 p.m. for high school students. However, a ten-minute difference is not 
expected to have a significant effect on private tutoring expenditure, so Jeonnam is 
categorized as a control group for high school students.  
The timing of the implementation of the reforms posed an additional challenge for the 
identification of the treatment. As described in subsection 3.2 below, the data used in this 
analysis were drawn from a survey completed by parents twice a year. The problem is that 
some regional reforms were implemented during one of these reference periods: the first 
being from March to May and the second from July to September. For example, in the cases 
of Gangwon, which introduced a change on 30 March 2012, and Daejeon, which imposed an 
initial curfew on 10 April 2009, including these regions in the analysis might have influenced 
the results and so they were dropped from the analysis. As a result, we are left with five 
treatment groups for middle school students (Daegu, Jeonnam, Incheon, Gyeonggi, and Jeju) 
and four treatment groups for high school students (Daegu, Gwangju, Gyeonggi, and 
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Incheon). It should also be borne in mind that the enforcement of the curfews also differs 
across regions and school levels8.  
However, the credibility of this approach relies on a set of assumptions. First, the parallel 
trend assumption needs to hold in order for a DD estimator to yield a consistent estimate of 
the treatment effect; that is, in the absence of the treatment, private tutoring expenditure 
trends would have been the same in both treatment and control groups. This is analyzed 
graphically (Figure 1). Results seem to confirm this assumption for high school students 
(Figure 1 B and D): the average weekly hours and yearly expenditure dedicated to private 
tutoring in the treatment and control groups followed a parallel evolution between 2009 and 
2010 (prior to the enforcement of the hagwon curfew). This assumption does not seem to 
hold as strongly for middle school students (Figure 1 A and C). Thus, the results for middle 
school students have to be interpreted with caution and our analysis focuses primarily on the 
findings for high school students.   
 
                                                          
8
 We also performed the analysis splitting the treatment group into two (one hour reduction and two hour 
reduction), as the magnitude of the changes in the curfew was different. Main results remained basically 
unaltered and are available upon request. 
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Figure 1. Parallel trend assumption 
NOTE: All the variables regarding private tutoring expenditure are presented in 10 thousands of Korean won. 
 
A second issue is that the DD estimator is inconsistent if an ‘Ashenfelter dip’ occurs. The 
Ashenfelter dip indicates that treated individuals might have suffered bad outcomes 
immediately prior to treatment assignment due either to the selection of individuals or an 
anticipation of their participation in the treatment. However, here, anticipation of the 
implementation of the curfew did not result in parents increasing their private tutoring 
expenditure immediately prior to the imposition of the stricter curfew. 
Finally, the DD estimates would be biased if the composition of the treatment and control 
groups changed as a result of the treatment. This would only be a problem here if households 
moved between regions in search of less strict curfews on the operating hours of hagwon in 
order to consume more private tutoring services. However, there is no evidence of Korean 
families having increased their geographical mobility after 2009. Indeed, our results seem to 
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indicate that families adopted other strategies for countering the effects of the enforcement of 
the curfew. 
Given the existence of multiple groups and time periods, we opted to employ the general 
framework suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004) in which DD estimates and their standard 
errors derive from using OLS in repeated cross-sections of data on individuals –in our case, 
students- in both treatment and control groups for several years before and after a specific 
intervention. The equation at the individual level is 
 
                                                                                  (1)        
 
where  is the outcome of interest for individual i in region r in year t (private tutoring 
expenditure –in log terms- or hours devoted to private tutoring);  is a full set of region 
dummies;  is a full set of year dummies;  is individual-specific covariates (gender, 
dummies for household income, dummies for parents’ educational attainment, dummies for 
parents’ age, dummies for parents’ economic activity participation, and dummies for size of 
the region);  is an indicator as to whether the curfew is further strengthened in region r in 
year t; and  is an error term. The region fixed effects  capture any time-invariant 
difference in outcomes between the treatment and control groups, while the year fixed 
effects  capture how both groups are affected over time by any non-treatment forces 
(Slaughter, 2001:210). Our dependent variables take a zero value for a large number of 
households9. Following Tansel and Bircan (2006), we obtain consistent estimates using a 
tobit framework which controls for the censored nature of the data –the use of OLS, which 
assumes normally distributed data, would hence be inappropriate. Following the argument of 
                                                          
9
 In our sample, 41.3% of the middle and high school students do not take any kind of private tutoring. For one-
to-one private tutoring and hagwon private tutoring, those figures are 85.4% and 57.9%, respectively. 
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Bertrand et al. (2004), we compute robust standard errors to prevent overestimation of t-
statistics and significance levels. The DD estimator  can be interpreted as the effect of the 
enforcement of a curfew on operating hours of hagwon on private tutoring expenditure/ hours 
spent on private tutoring activities. 
Since curfews differ across school levels, the sample is divided into two subsamples: 
middle school and general high school students. The same estimation model is applied to 
both subsamples. Vocational high school students are excluded from the sample, as their 
academic profile and private tutoring consumption patterns differ significantly from students 
following the academic path10. Primary school students are excluded from the analysis too, as 
the consumption of private tutoring is mainly concentrated at higher educational levels.  
Additionally, in the last part of our analysis, we split the high school sample into two 
(high- and low-income households) to check for the existence of heterogeneous effects of the 
enforcement of the curfew on the time and money spent on different types of tutoring. This 
exercise allows us to provide a clear picture of the redistributive effects of enforcing the 
curfew.  
 
3.2. Data 
 
This paper employs the Survey on Private Education Expenditure (SPEE) conducted since 
2007 by the Korean National Statistics Office (KOSTAT). It provides detailed information on 
the consumption of private education services by Korean students (time spent, expenditure, 
type of tutoring). The survey is answered twice a year (June and October) by 46,000 parents 
of students attending 1,081 elementary, middle, and high schools across the country.  
                                                          
10
 Choi et al. (2012) discuss the different profile of vocational high school students. 
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Students at each school level are selected by a stratification procedure designed to be 
representative of the national population at that school level. More specifically, after 
stratifying schools into four levels (elementary, middle, general and vocational high school) 
and 16 cities and provinces, the schools are independently sampled by grades. For elementary 
school, grades are stratified into 1~3 grades and 4~6 grades, and then three classes are 
randomly chosen per school. For middle and high schools, one class is sampled per school 
(KOSTAT 2011). 
We use data from 2009 to 2012. The rationale behind this choice is that, since 2009, 
KOSTAT provides information by administrative district -that is, by provinces and large 
cities-, which constitutes crucial information for performing the DD estimation, as each 
province and large city has its own education office and hagwon operating hours differ from 
one office to another. Thus, the availability of information for each province/ city facilitates 
the analysis of the impact of changes in the hagwon curfew on private tutoring expenses. 
Several regions that implemented amendments to the ordinance during the reference 
periods of the survey are excluded from the sample. They include Daejeon and Jeonbuk, 
which enacted their initial curfews during the 2009 reference periods, and Gangwon and 
Chungnam, which changed their curfews during the 2012 reference periods. As a result, we 
work with a sample of 190,276 middle and general high school students11, from an overall 
sample of 349,365 students. 
The dataset provides detailed information about the number of hours dedicated to private 
tutoring and the corresponding expenditure on these services. Private tutoring expenditure is 
reported for each subject (Korean, English, math, and science) and for each tutoring type (i.e., 
one-to-one tuition, group tuition, hagwon lessons, use of textbook combined with visit from a 
                                                          
11
 A student who reported that her average weekly hours spent on private tutoring for academic purpose was 80 
hours was dropped from the analysis as it is clearly an abnormal value.  
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tutor, and paid internet and correspondence lecture tuition). All the variables concerning 
expenditure are expressed in real terms, adjusted to 2010 prices using a consumer price index.  
The dataset contains information on student characteristics (gender and academic 
performance in class), household characteristics (monthly household income, parents’ 
education level, age, and economic activity participation), and the size of the region in which 
the household resides. These variables, except for academic performance in class (due to the 
potential problem of endogeneity12), are included in the regression model as individual-
specific covariates. Treatment variables are identified as follows. A regulation dummy is 
assigned a value of one for regions and time periods subject to the policy strengthening the 
initial curfew on hagwon. Since the identification of treatment groups differs according to 
school level, these regulation dummies are created for each school level. Tables A1 and A2 in 
the Appendix summarize the definitions and the main descriptive statistics, respectively, of 
the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Table A2 presents the mean values of the main variables in each sample. The first column 
shows the overall mean for all students, while columns two and three report the means for 
middle and general high school students. The fourth and fifth columns compare student 
characteristics according to whether they receive private tutoring or not. Compared to high 
school students, middle school students spend more time and more money on private tutoring. 
Moreover, their consumption of private tutoring seems to be heavily concentrated on hagwon 
tutoring, while high school students also spend a significant amount of money on private, 
one-to-one tuition (with high school students spending almost twice as much as middle 
school students).  
While classes at the hagwon are the most popular form of private tutoring, the use of 
textbook and internet and correspondence lectures are the least frequently used methods. 
                                                          
12
 Nevertheless, main results remained unchanged when introducing previous performance in the analysis. 
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SPEE data show a positive correlation between household income and time spent on one-to-
one tuition, suggesting that this method is considered the most effective for improving pupils’ 
academic performance. However, to the best of our knowledge, no analyses of the 
heterogeneous effects of tuition methods on academic achievement have yet been performed. 
More interestingly, there are systematic differences in student characteristics depending on 
whether or not they receive private tutoring. In general, those receiving private tutoring are 
likely to be female, high academic achievers, and from high socio-economic backgrounds 
(Table A2). The positive correlation between students’ achievement and the consumption of 
private tutoring indicates that the primary objective of such tuition in Korea is not to 
complement deficient academic achievement, but rather it constitutes a strategy for high 
academic performers to maintain and strengthen their competitive advantage. This finding is 
in line with previous studies, see for example, Kim (2007) and Kim (2009).  
In the case of students’ socio-economic backgrounds, the fourth and fifth columns of Table 
A2 indicate that the proportion of students whose parents have at least a university degree 
and the proportion of students whose monthly household income is more than 4 million won 
are substantially higher among students that receive private tutoring than those who do not. 
These figures imply that households with high socio-economic status may tend to provide 
their children with additional educational opportunities in the form of private tutoring. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
We present the average treatment effects of regulating the operating hours of hagwon on 
the time devoted to private tutoring (Subsection 4.1) and on expenditure dedicated to these 
activities (4.2). The article concludes with a discussion of the study’s main findings (4.3). 
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4.1. The impact of the enforcement of the hagwon curfew on the time dedicated to private 
tutoring activities 
 
 Table 2 presents the average treatment effect of the regulation of the operating hours of 
hagwon on the number of hours dedicated to all kinds of private tutoring activities. The non-
significant coefficients clearly show that the extension of the curfew failed to reduce the time 
spent on private tutoring activities both for middle and high school students. There are two 
potential explanations for this finding: first that the policy failed to cut the time dedicated to 
classes offered by hagwon. This being the case, it could simply be concluded that the policy 
was ineffective. Second, the policy might have succeeded in reducing the amount of time 
spent on hagwon classes, but that this reduction was completely or partly offset by an 
increase in the consumption of other types of private tutoring. Although the SPEE does not 
provide details regarding the amount of time spent on each type of private tutoring activity, 
the results in subsection 4.2 seem to support this second scenario. 
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Table 2. Effects of the enforcement of the curfew on hours spent on private tutoring 
VARIABLES Middle school High school 
Regulation 0.011 -0.081 
 (0.126) (0.101) 
Female -0.353*** 0.336*** 
 (0.065) (0.049) 
Father’s education   
  High school 1.988*** 0.813*** 
 (0.235) (0.154) 
  Undergraduate 2.930*** 1.878*** 
 (0.242) (0.160) 
  Graduate school 2.823*** 2.085*** 
 (0.267) (0.179) 
Mother’s education   
  High school 0.938*** 0.697*** 
 (0.228) (0.146) 
  Undergraduate 1.182*** 1.254*** 
 (0.239) (0.155) 
  Graduate school 1.300*** 1.612*** 
 (0.296) (0.201) 
Household income   
  1~2 million won 2.059*** 1.443*** 
 (0.264) (0.217) 
2~3 million won 5.016*** 3.368*** 
 (0.257) (0.211) 
3~4 million won 6.750*** 4.780*** 
 (0.256) (0.211) 
4~5 million won 7.451*** 5.516*** 
 (0.260) (0.213) 
5~6 million won 7.989*** 6.250*** 
 (0.265) (0.218) 
6~7 million won 8.569*** 6.795*** 
 (0.279) (0.227) 
More than 7 million won 8.810*** 7.059*** 
 (0.268) (0.219) 
Father’s age   
40s 0.628*** 0.694* 
 (0.189) (0.402) 
  50s 0.249 0.262 
 (0.216) (0.405) 
Mother’s age    
  40s -0.257*** 0.503*** 
 (0.097) (0.148) 
  50s -0.150 0.753*** 
 (0.202) (0.173) 
Economic activity participation   
  Mother only -1.831*** -1.307*** 
 (0.181) (0.138) 
  Both -0.339*** -0.709*** 
 (0.068) (0.0518) 
  None -4.909*** -2.399*** 
 (0.358) (0.303) 
Size of region   
Metropolitan city 0.782** -4.538*** 
 (0.354) (0.333) 
Small city 1.736*** -3.211*** 
 (0.195) (0.136) 
Rural area 0.289 -5.710*** 
 (0.213) (0.163) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes 
Observations 70,176 107,409 
NOTE: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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The coefficients of the control variables are consistent with results reported in most 
previous studies. Students from higher income households and whose parents record a higher 
educational attainment tend to invest more time in private tuition. It has also been shown that 
students in households where the father is the sole breadwinner (category of reference for the 
economic activity participation variable) spend more time on private tutoring than their 
counterparts do. This may be attributed to the fact that the fathers in such households tend to 
have well-paid job13 and stay-at-home mothers can spend more time and energy on taking 
care of the educational activities of their children. These results suggest that educational 
expectations of parents vary according to their level of education and the importance of 
budgetary constraints on their being able to participate in private tutoring activities. This 
should be borne in mind when analyzing the next set of results (4.2). 
 
4.2. The impact of the enforcement of the hagwon curfew on spending on private tutoring 
activities 
  
Table 3 presents the average treatment effect of the enforcement of the hagwon curfew on 
total private tutoring expenditure (first and fourth columns). We also calculate the impact of 
strengthening the curfew on private, one-to-one and group tuition expenditure and on hagwon 
tutoring expenditure separately, in order to identify the existence of a substitution effect. The 
main finding reported in Table 3 is that the extension of the curfew did not significantly 
reduce total expenditure on private tuition. As expected, the enforcement of the curfew was 
successful in decreasing expenditure on hagwon tutoring for both middle and high school 
students. This reduction in spending was greater for high school students, suggesting that the 
                                                          
13
 According to the SPEE from 2009 to 2012, the average monthly household income is slightly higher for 
double-income families, but the average monthly household income per earner is much higher for single-income 
families with the father as the only breadwinner. This implies that some of the fathers in such households have a 
well-paid job, enough not to need an extra income earner in their households. 
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policy has had a greater impact on high school students, who are more likely to stay late at 
school. 
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Table 3. Effects of the enforcement of the curfew on private tutoring expenditure 
 Middle school High school 
VARIABLES Expenditure 1:1/Group Hagwon Expenditure 1:1/Group Hagwon 
Regulation -0.037 0.002 -0.127* -0.083 0.177 -0.197** 
 (0.053) (0.151) (0.073) (0.065) (0.129) (0.095) 
Female -0.025 0.190** -0.170*** 0.462*** 1.023*** 0.157*** 
 (0.027) (0.078) (0.037) (0.032) (0.063) (0.046) 
Father’s education       
High school 1.022*** 2.009*** 0.953*** 0.593*** 0.986*** 0.594*** 
 (0.101) (0.305) (0.131) (0.103) (0.206) (0.149) 
  Undergraduate 1.578*** 2.972*** 1.561*** 1.366*** 1.807*** 1.443*** 
 (0.104) (0.313) (0.135) (0.107) (0.213) (0.154) 
  Graduate school 1.587*** 3.198*** 1.670*** 1.563*** 2.051*** 1.746*** 
 (0.113) (0.339) (0.150) (0.118) (0.236) (0.171) 
Mother’s education       
  High school 0.390*** 0.415 0.428*** 0.488*** 0.763*** 0.363*** 
 (0.098) (0.290) (0.129) (0.098) (0.195) (0.140) 
  Undergraduate 0.640*** 1.514*** 0.540*** 0.929*** 1.545*** 0.864*** 
 (0.102) (0.302) (0.135) (0.104) (0.207) (0.149) 
 Graduate school 0.803*** 1.822*** 0.663*** 1.199*** 2.145*** 0.806*** 
 (0.122) (0.367) (0.169) (0.129) (0.257) (0.192) 
Household income       
  1~2 million won 0.846*** 0.853** 1.033*** 1.042*** 1.313*** 1.227*** 
 (0.117) (0.349) (0.153) (0.144) (0.306) (0.209) 
2~3 million won 2.228*** 2.844*** 2.520*** 2.416*** 3.197*** 2.597*** 
 (0.113) (0.336) (0.148) (0.140) (0.296) (0.203) 
3~4 million won 3.051*** 4.361*** 3.431*** 3.412*** 4.991*** 3.417*** 
 (0.112) (0.334) (0.148) (0.140) (0.294) (0.203) 
4~5 million won 3.472*** 5.640*** 3.768*** 3.946*** 5.968*** 3.698*** 
 (0.114) (0.336) (0.150) (0.141) (0.296) (0.205) 
5~6 million won 3.726*** 6.442*** 3.962*** 4.389*** 6.876*** 4.062*** 
 (0.116) (0.342) (0.154) (0.143) (0.301) (0.209) 
6~7 million won 3.930*** 6.884*** 4.181*** 4.787*** 7.531*** 4.320*** 
 (0.120) (0.357) (0.161) (0.148) (0.311) (0.217) 
More than 7 
million won 
3.992*** 7.528*** 4.104*** 4.828*** 8.165*** 4.195*** 
(0.117) (0.343) (0.156) (0.143) (0.300) (0.209) 
Father’s age       
40s 0.276*** 0.264 0.418*** 0.496* 0.089 1.024** 
 (0.079) (0.228) (0.108) (0.270) (0.505) (0.402) 
  50s 0.087 -0.087 0.274** 0.244 -0.202 0.606 
 (0.091) (0.259) (0.123) (0.272) (0.510) (0.405) 
Mother’s age        
  40s -0.009 0.276** -0.076 0.325*** 0.453** 0.209 
 (0.040) (0.117) (0.055) (0.098) (0.190) (0.143) 
  50s 0.127 0.583** -0.078 0.524*** 0.832*** 0.284* 
 (0.085) (0.242) (0.114) (0.114) (0.221) (0.165) 
Economic activity        
  Mother only -0.919*** -0.938*** -0.962*** -0.860*** -0.818*** -1.180*** 
 (0.079) (0.218) (0.104) (0.091) (0.179) (0.130) 
  Both -0.293*** -0.919*** -0.202*** -0.472*** -0.452*** -0.697*** 
 (0.028) (0.082) (0.039) (0.033) (0.066) (0.049) 
  None -2.379*** -2.736*** -2.476*** -1.624*** -1.589*** -2.089*** 
 (0.160) (0.433) (0.205) (0.201) (0.390) (0.292) 
Size of region       
Metropolitan city 0.368** 2.435*** -0.429** -2.008*** 1.331*** -5.347*** 
 (0.149) (0.460) (0.200) (0.223) (0.466) (0.308) 
Small city 0.475*** 0.618*** 0.133 -1.279*** 0.436** -2.981*** 
 (0.075) (0.223) (0.108) (0.091) (0.173) (0.137) 
Rural area -0.105 0.685*** -0.851*** -3.116*** -0.787*** -6.182*** 
 (0.086) (0.246) (0.122) (0.109) (0.205) (0.168) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70176 70176 70176 107409 107409 107409 
NOTE: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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  In the case of expenditure on private, one-to-one and group tuition (two more expensive 
substitutes for hagwon tutoring14), the coefficients are insignificant for both school types. 
However, a positive, albeit statistically non-significant coefficient, for high school students 
seems to suggest that the reduction in spending on hagwon classes might have led to an 
increase in consumption of other private tutoring activities (i.e., private, one-to-one and group 
tuition). 
The coefficients presented by the father’s and mother’s education, along with the 
household income dummies (Table 3) also indicate that yearly spending on private tutoring is 
significantly and positively correlated to household income and parental education. Indeed, 
the patterns followed by the socio-economic status variables are similar to those found when 
the dependent variable is the number of hours spent on private tutoring (Table 2). Households 
in which the father is a single-income earner spend the most amount of money on private 
tutoring activities. 
 
4.3. Discussion 
 
The DD estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the extension of the hagwon 
curfew did not significantly reduce the total time and expenditure dedicated to private 
tutoring as was intended, and that the government intervention was only successful in 
reducing hagwon tutoring costs. This seems to be in line with the second scenario proposed in 
subsection 4.1 in which the reduced consumption of hagwon tuition driven by the extension 
of the curfew is completely or partially replaced by the increase in consumption of other 
types of private tutoring, including private, one-to-one and group tuition.   
                                                          
14
 According to KRIVET (2008a), the mean hourly cost of private tutoring provided by hagwon for middle and 
high school students was 5,902 won. This figure for one-to-one and group private tutoring was around 16,000 
won per month - derived from KRIVET (2008b). 
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This substitution effect seems to be stronger among high school students. The impact of 
the regulation on one-to-one and group tuition for middle school students is not very different 
from zero (Table 3). However, the same estimate for high school students is 0.177, very 
similar to the decrease in expenditure on hagwon tutoring, although the value is statistically 
insignificant. 
To obtain a clearer picture of the substitution effect across tuition types, we checked for the 
existence of heterogeneous effects. Table 4 shows the heterogeneous effects by household 
income of the extension of the hagwon curfew on time and money spent on private tutoring 
for high school students.  
 
Table 4. Heterogeneous effects for high school students by household income 
 VARIABLES Hour Expenditure 1:1/Group Hagwon 
Low-income households -0.107 -0.077 0.347* -0.255* 
(Less than 4 million won) (0.149) (0.104) (0.210) (0.143) 
High-income households 0.044 -0.016 0.257 -0.084 
(More than 4 million won) (0.172) (0.100) (0.198) (0.156) 
NOTE: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
In the table, the whole sample of high school students is divided into two groups15: low-
income households and high-income household. Neither group of high school students 
reduces the total number of hours or expenditure dedicated to private tuition. We can 
conjecture that these effects are not heterogeneous across different income groups. However, 
if we examine the way in which the enforcement of the hagwon curfew has influenced private, 
one-to-one and group tuition and hagwon tutoring, we see that the two groups reacted quite 
differently to the intervention. The first row in Table 4 shows that high school students from 
                                                          
15
 In the SPEE dataset, information on actual household income is not provided. Parents self-reported to which 
of the eight monthly household income groups (see table A1) their household belonged to. The sample was 
divided into two groups – low-income and high-income households-. According to the Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey conducted by Korean National Statistics Office, average monthly household income was 
4,076,876 Korean won in 2012. We therefore took the 4 million Korean won as the threshold between both 
groups.  
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low-income households significantly increased their consumption of private, one-to-one and 
group tuition when they had to reduce significantly their consumption of hagwon tutoring. 
This is clear evidence that the substitution from private hagwon tutoring to private, one-to-
one and group tuition was more intense among lower income high school students. 
Conversely, high school students from high-income families did not seem to be as greatly 
affected by the intervention (given that all of the coefficients are insignificant despite 
showing the same signs as for the other group).  
 How can we explain the heterogeneous reactions of the two types of household to the 
policy and what are the consequences of these heterogeneous effects? Our results show that 
the demand of high school students for private tutoring is inelastic, given that they are likely 
to regard private tutoring services as indispensable for excelling on the CSAT, the critical 
point in their academic lives. Thus, when their consumption of hagwon tutoring was 
regulated by the policy intervention, a considerable number of high school students appear to 
have opted to increase their use of private, one-to-one and group tuition to offset the 
reduction in hagwon classes. More specifically, this substitution across types of tuition is 
driven mainly by high school students from low-income families, those traditionally more 
reliant on the private classes offered by hagwon (see Appendix A4). In contrast, high school 
students from high-income families have, in addition to being consumers of hagwon tutoring, 
been active buyers of other types of private tuition. In other words, given that their 
consumption of private tutoring services had already shown an inclination for one-to-one and 
group tuition, regulations on the supply of hagwon did not affect their choice as much. 
Finally, we checked the robustness of these results by performing a placebo test. In this test, 
we simulated the enforcement of the hagwon curfew as if it had been introduced between 
2009 and 2010, that is, one year before actual enforcement. This analysis was replicated both 
for the whole sample of high school students and for the high-income and low-income 
33 
 
households separately. Results are reported in Table 5 and, as expected, no significant effects 
were found. 
 
Table 5. Results of a placebo enforcement of the curfew for high school students. 
VARIABLES Hour Expenditure 1:1/Group Hagwon 
All -0.017 -0.113 -0.069 -0.159 
 (0.115) (0.073) (0.146) (0.109) 
Low-income households -0.005 -0.059 0.001 -0.201 
(Less than 4 million won) (0.167) (0.114) (0.234) (0.160) 
High-income households -0.056 -0.127 -0.039 -0.131 
(More than 4 million won) (0.201) (0.113) (0.231) (0.183) 
NOTE: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
The imposition of the strengthened hagwon curfew has been more successful in changing 
private tutoring consumption patterns than in reducing the total time dedicated to private 
tutoring and the resources spent on these activities. This raises issues of both efficiency and 
equity. In the case of efficiency, while families managed to reduce their consumption of 
hagwon – a foreseeable outcome, given the nature of the regulations, their children increased 
the amount of time – and money – spent on other, more expensive, types of private tuition. 
The policy failed therefore to achieve its main objective – reducing the consumption of 
private tutoring – due to the inelastic demand of such tutoring, closely linked to the 
overheated competition for admission to the most prestigious universities. The impact of the 
enforcement of the curfew on efficiency therefore depends on the effectiveness of each 
private tuition type for transmitting skills and, ultimately, the impact of these skills on 
economic growth. While examining this question is beyond the scope of this paper, it should 
be highlighted that if there are differences in quality between types of private tuition, the 
change in consumption patterns may have an impact on efficiency. Additionally, the impact 
of the enforcement of the curfew on efficiency is closely linked to its distributional effects. 
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Hence, an increase in the consumption of more expensive private tuition by low- income 
families may raise the overall performance of these students – that is, if the assumption of 
“superior quality” holds. Moreover, marginal gains in academic performance may prove to be 
crucial in an ultra-competitive environment. However, the substitution process generated by 
the extension of the curfew also has its losers, namely, the low-income families that paid for 
hagwon tutoring but who cannot afford other types of tuition. Therefore, as previous studies 
suggest that receiving private tuition has a positive impact on academic performance, the 
regulation has a negative impact on the equality of educational opportunities among this last 
subgroup of students. The analysis of the impact on academic performance of different types 
of private tutoring is thus a promising field for further research. 
To conclude, the Korean experience should serve to provide relevant guidelines for 
policymakers in countries with large private tutoring markets. The first lesson is 
straightforward: regulating – and effectively controlling – the operating hours of educational 
institutions has an impact on the consumption of the services provided by those institutions. 
However, the aggregate effect of these measures on the consumption of private tutoring is 
difficult to predict, as it seems to depend on the elasticity of demand of educational services, 
the existence of substitute services, and the profile of the consumers of the different types of 
private tuition. Imposing a strengthened curfew on the academies in Korea had a neutral 
effect on the overall consumption of private tutoring because of the inelastic demand for 
these activities and the existence of substitute services. Moreover, the Korean authorities 
learned decades ago that efforts to ban or regulate one-to-one tuition lead to an increase in 
black market activities. Therefore, policymakers who seek to cool the demand for private 
tutoring should perhaps focus their attention on tackling the underlying causes of the 
overheated demand for education, since the proliferation of private tutoring is usually the 
symptom of more complex issues. The overheated demand for private tutoring is generated, 
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among other causes16, by the combination of a widespread acceptance of education as the 
main social promotion mechanism, and the relatively scarce supply of high quality higher 
education institutions. While changing social perceptions would be a difficult long-term task, 
public authorities may help relaxing the demand for private tutoring through supply policies. 
Increasing the number of students admitted in high-quality public institutions and enhancing 
the quality of vocational studies are among the policies which could be explored.  
                                                          
16
 Kim and Park (2010) provide a literature review on this issue.  
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Appendix A1. Definition of main variables  
Variables Definition 
Hour Weekly hours spent on private tutoring for academic purpose 
Expenditure Yearly spending on private tutoring for academic purpose 
One-to-one tutoring Yearly spending on 'one-to-one tutoring' 
Group tutoring Yearly spending on 'group tutoring' 
Hagwon tutoring Yearly spending on 'taking lessons at hagwon' 
Workbook tutoring Yearly spending on 'textbooks with tutor's visit' type tutoring 
Internet tutoring Yearly spending on 'paid internet and correspondence lectures' type 
Female 1 if female; 0 otherwise 
Father’s education (The reference group is middle school degree of less) 
  High school 1 if father has a high school degree; 0 otherwise 
  University 1 if father has a university degree; 0 otherwise 
  Graduate school 1 if father has a graduate degree or more; 0 otherwise 
Mother’s education (The reference group is middle school degree or less) 
  High school 1 if mother has a high school degree; 0 otherwise 
  University 1 if mother has a university degree; 0 otherwise 
  Graduate school 1 if mother has a graduate degree or more; 0 otherwise 
Household income (The reference group is less than 1 million won) 
  1~2 million won 1 if monthly household income is between 1~2 million won; 0 
  2~3 million won 1 if monthly household income is between 2~3 million won; 0 
  3~4 million won 1 if monthly household income is between 3~4 million won; 0 
  4~5 million won 1 if monthly household income is between 4~5 million won; 0 
  5~6 million won 1 if monthly household income is between 5~6 million won; 0 
  6~7 million won 1 if monthly household income is between 6~7 million won; 0 
  More than 7 million won 1 if monthly household income is more than 7 million won; 0 
Father’s age (The reference group is father in his twenties or thirties) 
  40s 1 if father is in his forties; 0 otherwise 
  50s 1 if father is in his fifties; 0 otherwise 
Mother’s age (The reference group is mother in her twenties or thirties) 
  40s 1 if mother is in her forties; 0 otherwise 
  50s 1 if mother is in her fifties; 0 otherwise 
Economic activity (The reference group is only father works) 
  Mother only 1 if only mother works; 0 otherwise 
  Both 1 if both father and mother work; 0 otherwise 
  None 1 if neither father nor mother works; 0 otherwise 
Academic performance (The reference group is top 10% of the class) 
  10~30% 1 if student is between 10~30% of the class; 0 otherwise 
  30~60% 1 if student is between 30~60% of the class; 0 otherwise 
  60~80% 1 if student is between 60~80% of the class; 0 otherwise 
  Bottom 20% 1 if student is below bottom 20% of the class; 0 otherwise 
Size of the region (The reference group is Seoul) 
  Metropolitan city 1 if metropolitan city; 0 otherwise 
  Small city 1 if small city; 0 otherwise 
  Rural area 1 if rural area; 0 otherwise 
Regulation  1 if the strengthened curfew is implemented; 0 otherwise 
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Appendix A2. Descriptives of main variables 
 
Mean 
 
 
Variables 
All 
 
Students 
Middle 
School 
Students 
High 
school 
students 
No  
Tutoring 
(Hour = 0) 
Positive 
Tutoring 
(Hour > 0) 
Hour 4.991  6.924 3.707  0  8.495 
Expenditure 278.110  296.578  265.835 0  473.340 
One-to-one tutoring 68.004  46.752  82.129  0  115.742 
  Group tutoring 32.118  30.488  33.201  0  54.665  
  Hagwon tutoring 168.35  207.095  142.656  0  286.590  
  Workbook tutoring 3.794  8.083  0.943  0  6.458  
  Internet tutoring 5.808  4.159  6.904  0  9.885  
Female 0.477  0.472  0.481  0.462  0.488  
Father’s education 
     Middle school or less 0.051 0.049 0.051 0.086 0.026 
  High school 0.432  0.441  0.426  0.517  0.372  
  University 0.441  0.441  0.441  0.350  0.507  
  Graduate school 0.076 0.069  0.081  0.047  0.095  
Mother’s education 
     
  Middle school or less 0.054 0.050 0.058 0.087 0.032 
  High school 0.575  0.569  0.578  0.643  0.528  
  University 0.342  0.355  0.334  0.253  0.403  
  Graduate school 0.029  0.026  0.030  0.017  0.037  
Household income 
     
  Less than 1 million won 0.049 0.058 0.043 0.089 0.022 
  1~2 million won 0.138  0.143  0.134  0.211  0.086  
  2~3 million won 0.204  0.205  0.204  0.242  0.178  
  3~4 million won 0.214  0.213  0.215  0.196  0.226  
  4~5 million won 0.156  0.153  0.159  0.119  0.182  
  5~6 million won 0.098  0.094  0.100  0.064  0.122  
  6~7 million won 0.050  0.049  0.050  0.028  0.065  
  More than 7 million won 0.091  0.085  0.095  0.051  0.119  
Economic activity participation 
     
  Father only 0.359 0.372 0.351 0.328 0.381 
  Mother only 0.085 0.087 0.083 0.123 0.058 
  Both  0.538 0.518 0.552 0.519 0.552 
  None 0.018 0.023 0.014 0.030 0.009 
Academic performance 
     
  Top 10% 0.109 0.116 0.102 0.067 0.137 
  10~30% 0.208  0.215  0.204  0.148  0.250  
  30~60% 0.332  0.309  0.347  0.308  0.349  
  60~80% 0.216  0.210  0.221  0.266  0.182  
Bottom 20% 0.135  0.150  0.126  0.211  0.082  
Number of observations 190,276 75,973 114,303 78,480 111,796 
NOTE: All the variables regarding private tutoring expenditure are annual spending presented in 10 thousands 
of Korean won 
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Appendix A3. Number of observations by region, year, and school level 
   Middle school students (p.m.)  
 Region 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
 Daegu 1,343 1,348 1,276 1,226 5,193 
 Jeonnam 878 905 910 999 3,692 
Treatment group Incheon 1,904 1,882 1,810 1,722 7,318 
 Gyeonggi 3,916 3,850 3,818 3,697 15,281 
 Jeju 687 701 833 861 3,082 
 Seoul 3,291 3,243 3,196 3,013 12,743 
 Busan 1,588 1,576 1,554 1,555 6,273 
Control group Gwangju 1,527 1,481 1,424 1,503 5,935 
 Chungbuk 866 847 861 746 3,320 
 Gyeongbuk  828 837 810 799 3,274 
 Ulsan 906 896 862 777 3,441 
 Gyeongnam 1,606 1,601 1,588 1,626 6,421 
 Total 19,340 19,167 18,942 18,524 75,973 
   High school students (p.m.)  
 Region 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
 Daegu 2,273 2,263 2,218 2,302 9,056  
Treatment group Gwangju 2,261 2,301 2,228 2,246 9,036  
 Gyeonggi 4,367 4,303 4,260 4,037 16,967  
 Incheon 1,620 1,666 1,581 1,498 6,365  
 Seoul 4,570 4,619 4,806 4,447 18,442  
 Busan 2,244 2,207 2,351 2,164 8,966  
 Ulsan 1,464 1,431 1,408 1,225 5,528  
Control group Chungbuk 1,642 1,656 2,119 2,009 7,426  
 Jeonnam 1,969 1,980 2,016 1,858 7,823  
 Gyeongbuk 2,453 2,434 2,634 2,367 9,888  
 Gyeongnam 2,576 2,508 2,546 2,405 10,035  
 Jeju 1,073 1,082 1,315 1,301 4,771  
 Total 28,512 28,450 29,482 27,859 114,303 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Appendix A4. Distribution of expenditures for different forms of private tutoring by 
household income 
Middle school students 
Household income One-to-one Group Hagwon Workbook Internet Total 
Less than 1 million won 6.600 5.844 57.976 4.045 1.422 75.887 
(9%) (8%) (76%) (5%) (2%) 
1~2 million won 11.730 10.559 104.474 5.835 1.821 134.419 
(9%) (8%) (78%) (4%) (1%) 
2~3 million won 22.005 20.692 162.117 8.201 3.145 216.161 
(10%) (10%) (75%) (4%) (1%) 
3~4 million won 37.008 30.100 216.726 8.969 4.482 297.286 
(12%) (10%) (73%) (3%) (2%) 
4~5 million won 58.761 39.809 255.031 9.047 5.512 368.160 
(16%) (11%) (69%) (2%) (1%) 
5~6 million won 78.803 47.842 286.087 8.596 6.103 427.430 
(18%) (11%) (67%) (2%) (1%) 
6~7 million won 95.495 51.604 315.634 9.586 6.830 479.150 
(20%) (11%) (66%) (2%) (1%) 
More than 7 million won 132.854 57.628 331.414 8.983 5.503 536.383 
  (25%) (11%) (62%) (2%) (1%)   
High school students 
Household income One-to-one Group Hagwon workbook Internet Total 
Less than 1 million won 11.617 5.870 42.326 0.714 2.899 63.427 
(18%) (9%) (67%) (1%) (5%) 
1~2 million won 22.170 12.267 65.156 0.752 3.551 103.896 
(21%) (12%) (63%) (1%) (3%) 
2~3 million won 39.132 20.788 99.899 0.924 5.393 166.137 
(24%) (13%) (60%) (1%) (3%) 
3~4 million won 65.737 31.971 136.760 1.171 6.527 242.167 
(27%) (13%) (56%) (0%) (3%) 
4~5 million won 94.538 40.562 165.750 0.866 8.553 310.269 
(30%) (13%) (53%) (0%) (3%) 
5~6 million won 125.854 48.919 202.205 0.917 9.273 387.167 
(33%) (13%) (52%) (0%) (2%) 
6~7 million won 156.437 58.354 227.702 0.828 9.184 452.505 
(35%) (13%) (50%) (0%) (2%) 
More than 7 million won 222.274 62.478 256.622 1.063 11.102 553.540 
  (40%) (11%) (46%) (0%) (2%)   
NOTE: all the expenditures are annual spending presented in 10 thousands of Korean won. The percentages of 
students using each type of private tutoring per income group are in parentheses. 
 
 
